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of Aggregate Federal Personal Income Tax
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By RICHARD J. CEBULA*
ABSTRACT. Using the most current data available, this study seeks to
identify any new as well as traditional determinants of personal
income tax evasion. A variety of empirical estimates find that income
tax rates, the IRS audit rate and IRS penalty interest rates, and the
unemployment rate all influence tax evasion. In addition, rarely inves-
tigated variables including the tax-free interest rate, the public’s job
approval rating of the president, and the public’s dissatisfaction with
government, along with previously unstudied variables, namely, the
real interest rate yield on Moody’s Baa-rated long-term corporate
bonds and the real interest rate yield on three-year Treasury notes,
also affect income tax evasion.
Introduction
Income tax evasion effectively consists of taxable income that is either
unreported or underreported to the IRS; it also can consist of spurious
or inflated tax deductions. Studies of income tax evasion behavior
essentially fall into three categories. First, there are the principally
theoretical models of tax evasion behavior, such as Allingham and
Sandmo (1972), Falkinger (1988), Klepper, Nagin, and Spurr (1991),
Das-Gupta (1994), Pestieau, Possen, and Slutsky (1994), Caballe and
Panades (1997), and Gahramanov (2009). Second, there are a number
of studies that either (a) use questionnaires or (b) undertake experi-
ments, such as Spicer and Lundsted (1976), Spicer and Thomas (1982),
Baldry (1987), Alm, Jackson, and McKee (1992), Thurman (1991), and
Alm, McClelland, and Schulze (1999). Third, there are those studies
that use what is referred to as “official data,” such as Tanzi (1982,
1983), Clotfelter (1983), Carson (1984), Long and Gwartney (1987),
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Pyle (1989), Feinstein (1991), Erard and Feinstein (1994), Feige (1994),
Cebula (2001, 2004), Ali, Cecil, and Knoblett (2001), Ledbetter (2004,
2007), Cebula and Coombs (2009), and Alm and Yunus (2009).
In this literature, it is widely believed that the degree of federal
personal income tax evasion in the economy as a whole is positively
affected by income tax rates (Tanzi 1982; Clotfelter 1983; Feige 1994).
This perspective is simple: the higher the income tax rate, the greater
the benefit (in terms of a reduced tax liability) from not reporting
taxable income, ceteris paribus. It is also widely accepted that the
greater the risk associated with underreporting or not reporting
taxable income, the less the degree to which economic agents will
choose either to not report or to underreport their taxable income
(Alm, Jackson, and McKee 1992; Erard and Feinstein 1994; Cebula and
Coombs 2009).
This study seeks to add to this rich literature by empirically in-
vestigating determinants of aggregate federal personal income tax
evasion in the United States using the most current data available.
To date, the empirical literature has effectively failed to investigate
determinants of aggregate personal income tax evasion in the United
States for recent years; indeed, except for a single somewhat narrowly
focused study that investigated tax evasion and government-spending-
induced budget deficits through the year 2001 (Cebula and Coombs
2009), the most recent year considered in the tax evasion determinants
literature is in fact 1997 (Cebula 2004, 2008; Ali, Cecil, and Knoblett
2001; Alm and Yunus 2009). However, the IRS (2010) has very recently
released new time-series data on tax evasion running through the year
2005. Using these new data derived by the IRS (2010), the present
study seeks to identify key personal income tax evasion determinants
in the United States through the year 2005. Aside from investigating
the most commonly recognized factors that allegedly influence tax
evasion, such as a measure of income tax rates and the IRS audit rate
and the IRS penalty interest rate levels, the unemployment rate, and
the Tax Reform Act of 1986, a variety of other potential influences on
income tax evasion is investigated. These include rarely investigated
variables (in the tax evasion literature) such as the tax-free interest
rate yield, the public’s job approval rating of the president, and the
public’s dissatisfaction with government per se, along with previously
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unstudied variables, namely, the real interest rate yield on Moody’s
Baa-rated long-term corporate bonds and the real interest rate yield on
three-year Treasury notes. The latter two of these explanatory vari-
ables have never before been considered in a time-series analysis
involving tax evasion. The basic framework for the empirical analysis
is presented in the next section of this study. The formal empirical
analysis is provided in the subsequent section of the study. Finally, the
closing section provides an overview of the study findings, an inter-
pretation of the results, and certain policy implications thereof.
Basic Framework for the Analysis
In this study, the relative probability that the representative economic
agent will not report his/her taxable income to the IRS is treated as
positively impacted by (an increasing function of) the expected gross
benefits to the agent of not reporting income, eb, and as negatively
impacted by (a decreasing function of) the expected gross costs to the
agent of not reporting income, ec. Thus, the ratio of the probability of
not reporting income to the IRS, pnr, to the probability of reporting
income to the IRS, (1-pnr), is described for the representative eco-
nomic agent by:
pnr pnr f eb ec f feb ec1 −( ) = ( ) > <, , ,0 0 (1)
Expressing probabilities in relative terms such as shown in Equation
(1) possesses the virtue that it thereby reflects the form of the available
tax evasion data, i.e., data where (as described below) the aggregate
degree of federal personal income tax evasion is expressed in relative
terms (IRS 2010). This model of tax evasion behavior expands that
developed by Cebula and Coombs (2009).
As already observed, the gross expected benefits from not reporting
income to the IRS are hypothesized to be directly related to the federal
personal income tax rate (Cagan 1958; Bawley 1982; Tanzi 1982;
Clotfelter 1983; Pyle 1989; Feige 1994). To reflect the federal personal
income tax rate, most previous studies using official data for the
United States have adopted either of two alternative measures: an
average effective federal personal income tax rate (AEPT) or the
maximum marginal federal personal income tax rate (MAXT). In this
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study, the MAXT measure of the income tax rate is adopted because,
as argued in Cebula (2004), Connelly (2004), and Gahramanov (2009),
this tax rate is likely to be a more representative measure of the overall
degree of progressivity of the personal income tax rate schedule than
AEPT would be. Accordingly, it is hypothesized, ceteris paribus, that:
eb g MAXT gMAXT= ( ) >, 0 (2)
Next, this study endeavors to allow for the potential impact of legal
tax avoidance on illegal tax evasion. To do this, we test the hypothesis
by Cebula (2004: 419) that “the higher the tax-free interest rate yield
on high grade municipal bonds [TF] relative to the taxable interest rate
yield on . . . high quality [taxable] bonds or notes such as ten year U.S.
Treasury notes [TEN], the greater the incentive to engage in legal tax
avoidance and the lower the incentive to engage in tax evasion.” Thus,
it is expected in the present study that the greater the TF/TEN ratio, the
lower the aggregate degree of federal personal income tax evasion,
ceteris paribus. Hence, Equation (2) is now rewritten as:
eb h MAXT TF TEN h hMAXT TF TEN= ( ) > <, , ,0 0 (3)
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA) may have been perceived by at
least some portion of the general public as an honest, good-faith effort
to reform, that is, to simplify and increase the equity of the Internal
Revenue Code. As Musgrave observed (1987: 59): “The Tax Reform
Act of 1986 is the most sweeping reform since the early 1940s. . . .”
Indeed, the TRA did introduce a number of reforms, many of which
are outlined in broad terms in Ott and Vegari (2003), Barth (1991),
and Sanger, Sirmans, and Turnbull (1990). For example, as observed
in Ott and Vegari (2003: 279): “The Act introduced major cuts in the
personal tax rate. When fully effective (by January 1, 1988), only two
tax brackets, set at 15 and 28 percent, were to replace the 14 bracket
tax schedule with rates in the range of 11 to 50 percent . . . while
it broadened the tax base by reducing the itemized deduction.”
Musgrave (1987: 59) further observes that prior to the TRA, a slow
erosion of the income tax base had been occurring. Musgrave (1987:
57) was particularly dismayed by the widening of tax loopholes
and the emergence of high income tax shelters that had “gained
momentum in recent years and undermined the public’s faith in the
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income tax.” In this vein, Barth (1991) and Sanger, Sirmans, and
Turnbull (1990) describe how the TRA decreased depreciation benefits
from financial investments in residential as well as commercial real
estate, established limitations on the tax deductibility of losses from
“passive” investments that affected limited partnerships syndications
(including those involving real estate ventures), and terminated favo-
rable capital gains treatment of real estate. Musgrave (1987: 59) also
expressed concern that the “compounding of the investment tax
credit and accelerated depreciation diluted and distorted the base of
the corporate income tax.” Musgrave (1987: 59) asserted that the TRA
“reversed these trends, a major accomplishment that all reformers
will welcome.” Interestingly, Ott and Vegari (2003: 279) observe
that, among other things, under the TRA “the 10 percent investment
tax credit for the purchase of equipment was repealed, and the life of
the investment was increased for depreciation purposes.” Based on
Musgrave’s (1987) arguments, then, it is expected in the present study
that taxpayers might well have favorably regarded the TRA and been
less resentful of the Internal Revenue Code than before, at least
initially. Thus, it is hypothesized here that during the time frame when
the TRA was enacted and became fully effective (1986–1987) and
also received the greatest publicity, reduced taxpayer resentment of
the federal income tax system/Internal Revenue Code would, at least
temporarily, have resulted in a reduced degree of tax evasion, ceteris
paribus. The reason this reaction to the TRA might be only temporary
is revealed in the words of Slemrod (1992: 45), who argues that it
would take at least some time for taxpayers “to learn about and adjust
to the new law [the TRA].” Consequently, it is hypothesized here that,
for the period when the TRA was first implemented, October 1986,
through the period when the TRA became “fully effective,” January 1,
1987, the aggregate degree of federal personal income tax evasion was
reduced. Accordingly, Equation (3) above is replaced by Equation (4):
eb j MAXT TF TEN TRA j j jMAXT TF TEN TRA= ( ) > < <, , , , ,0 0 0 (4)
Next, based on Alm and Yunus (2009), Gahramanov (2009), and
Cebula and Coombs (2009), it is expected that the higher the unem-
ployment rate (UN), the greater the expected benefits of personal
income tax evasion, ceteris paribus. This is based on the reasoning
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that the higher the unemployment rate, the greater the extent to which
the unemployed work in the “underground economy” and hence do
not report income. Furthermore, this effect may be reinforced to the
extent that a higher unemployment creates an incentive even for
still-employed people to avoid taxes to the degree that they try to
covet extra funds (by underreporting income) in anticipation of
a possible future lay-off (Alm and Yunus 2009; Gahramanov 2009;
Cebula and Coombs 2009). As a result, Equation (4) is expanded to
Equation (5):
eb j MAXT TF TEN TRA UN j j
j j
MAXT TF TEN
TRA UN
= ( ) > <
< >
, , , , , ,
,
0 0
0 0
(5)
Finally, there is the issue of the public’s job approval rating of the
president (APPROV). Following the study of the period prior to 1998
by Cebula (2008), it is argued here that the higher the public’s job
approval rating of the president’s performance in office, the greater
the degree to which there is satisfaction with the president’s actions
and policies. The latter can be interpreted, at least to some degree, as
implying less public resentment towards or greater approval of his
various spending and/or tax policies (as well, perhaps, as his other
policies). Similarly, the lower the public’s job approval rating of the
president, the greater the degree to which the public is likely to be
dissatisfied with the president’s actions and policies. In turn, it can be
reasonably argued that the latter can be interpreted, to at least some
extent, as implying greater resentment of or less public support of his
various spending and/or tax policies (as well, perhaps, as his other
policies). Stated somewhat differently, the lower the level of APPROV,
the greater the subjective benefits (“secondary gain”) from personal
income tax evasion, whereas the higher the level of APPROV the
lower the subjective benefits (secondary gain) of personal income tax
evasion. Based on this symmetrical argument, it is hypothesized that
the greater the public’s job approval rating of the president, the lower
the eb and hence the lower the aggregate degree of personal income
taxation, ceteris paribus. Accordingly, Equation (5) is transformed into
Equation (6), as follows:
eb j MAXT TF TEN TRA UN APPROV
j j j jMAXT TF TEN TRA UN
= ( )
> < <
, , , , ,
, , ,0 0 0 > <0 0, jAPPROV
(6)
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The expected gross costs of not reporting income to the IRS are
hypothesized to be an increasing function of the expected risks/
costs thereof (Alm, Jackson, and McKee 1992; Pestieau, Possen, and
Slutsky 1994; Erard and Feinstein 1994; Caballe and Panades 1997;
Alm and Yunus 2009; Cebula and Coombs 2009). In this study, to
the representative economic agent, the expected risks/costs from not
reporting or from underreporting taxable income to the IRS are
enhanced by an increase in AUDIT, the percentage of filed federal
personal income tax returns that is formally audited by IRS exam-
iners, ceteris paribus. Indeed, the experience of an IRS tax audit
could imply nonpecuniary (“psychic”) costs as well as pecuniary
costs (including outlays for legal or other representation, along with
the value of one’s own lost time) above and beyond any potential
added taxes, penalties, and interest assessed by the IRS. In addition
to AUDIT, it is hypothesized that the expected risks/costs of tax
evasion also include the magnitude of the IRS-imposed penalties
[PENALTY] should one’s tax evasion activities be successfully
detected by the IRS. To reflect this penalty, this study adopts the
average interest rate charged by the IRS in each year on detected
unreported income. Clearly, the greater the value of PENALTY,
ceteris paribus, the greater the ec and hence the lower the degree
of aggregate personal income taxation that is expected. Thus, we
have:
ec AUDIT PENALTY j jAUDIT PENALTY= ( ) > >j , , ,0 0 (7)
Substituting from Equations (6) and (7) into Equation (1) yields:
pnr pnr b MAXT TF TEN TRA UN APPROV
AUDIT PENALTY bMAXT
1 −( ) = (
)
, , , , ,
, , > < <
> < < <
0 0 0
0 0 0 0
, , ,
, , ,
b b
b b b b
TFTEN TRA
UN APPROV AUDIT PENALTY
(8)
Let AGI represent the actual total value of the aggregate federal
adjusted gross income in the economy, that is, AGI = UAGI + RAGI,
where UAGI is the dollar size of the unreported aggregate federal
adjusted gross income in the economy, and RAGI is the dollar size of
the reported aggregate federal adjusted gross income in the economy.
It reasonably follows overall that:
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UAGI pnr AGI= ( ) ∗ (9)
and
RAGI pnr AGI= −( ) ∗1 (10)
It then follows that:
UAGI RAGI pnr AGI pnr AGI pnr pnr= ( ) ∗ −( ) ∗ = ( ) −( )1 1 (11)
From Equations (8) and (11), substitution for pnr/(1 - pnr) yields the
following model of aggregate personal income tax evasion:
UAGI RAGI b MAXT TF TEN TRA UN APPROV AUDIT
PENALTY bMAXT
= (
) >
, , , , , ,
, 0, , , ,
, ,
b b b
b b b
TFTEN TRA UN
APPROV AUDIT PENALTY
< < >
< < <
0 0 0
0 0 0
(12)
Empirical Analysis
This section of the study provides the empirical findings. It is divided
into two subsections. In the first subsection, the basic model is esti-
mated and analyzed. The model is estimated in linear form and then,
as tests of consistency and robustness, semi-log and log-log estimates
are also provided. In the subsequent subsection, the model is expanded
with two additional variables, one very rarely considered and the other
entirely ignored, in the tax evasion literature to date. In addition, the
estimates in this case (the second subsection) are two-stage least
squares. It is noted here that an interpretation of the specific estimation
results is to be provided both in the first subsection and, from a different
perspective, namely, a policy perspective, in the Conclusion.
Estimates of the Basic Model
Based on the framework provided in Equation (12) above, the
following reduced-form equation is to be estimated initially:
UAGI RAGI a a MAXT a TF TEN a TRA a UN
a APP
t t t t t( ) = + + ( ) + +
+
−
−
−0 1 1 2 1 3 4 1
5 ROV a AUDIT a PENALTY ut t t− − −+ + +1 6 1 7 1
(13)
where:
(UAGI/RAGI )t = the ratio of the aggregate unreported federal adjusted
gross income in year t to the aggregate reported federal adjusted gross
income in year t, expressed as a percent;
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a0 = constant term;
MAXTt-1 = the maximum federal personal income tax rate in year t - 1,
expressed as a percent;
(TF/TEN )t-1 = the ratio for year t - 1 of the average annual tax-free
interest rate yield on high-grade municipal bonds to the average
annual taxable interest rate yield on 10-year U.S. Treasury notes,
expressed as a percent;
TRAt = a binary (dummy) variable for the years 1986 through 1987,
when the Tax Reform Act of 1986 was initially implemented and
became effective: TRAt = 1 for the years 1986 and 1987, and TRAt = 0
otherwise;
UNt-1 = the average percentage unemployment rate of the civilian
labor force in year t - 1;
APPROVt-1 = the public’s average job approval rating of the president
in year t - 1: values for APPROVt-1 lie between 0 and 100;
AUDITt-1 = the percentage of filed federal personal income tax returns
in year t - 1 that was subjected to a formal IRS audit involving IRS
examiners;
PENALTYt-1 = the average percentage interest rate used by the IRS in
year t - 1 to assess interest penalties on detected unreported income;
and
u = stochastic error term.
The study period runs from 1976 through 2005. The choice of the
year 1976 reflects the limited availability of dependable IRS penalty
data; the choice of the year 2005 reflects the most recent availability
of the official (UAGI/RAGI) data. The data are all annual. The (UAGI/
RAGI) data were obtained from the IRS (2010: Table 6). The data for
the variable MAXT were obtained from the IRS (2009: Table 1). The
AUDIT data were obtained from the Government Accounting Office
(1996: Table I.1), and the U.S. Census Bureau (1994: Table 519,
1998: Table 550, 1999: Table 556, 2001: Table 546, 2009: Table 469),
and the PENALTY data were obtained from the IRS (1976–2009). The
TRA variable is a dummy variable. The data for the variables TF/TEN
and UN were obtained from the Council of Economic Advisors
(2010: Tables B-73, B-35). The data for the variable APPROV were
obtained from the Gallup Poll (2009). The mean value for variable
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(UAGI/RAGI) for the study period was 13.42, with a standard devia-
tion of 1.69.
The tax evasion estimates (the estimates of the ratio of the aggregate
unreported federal adjusted gross income in year t to the aggregate
reported federal adjusted gross income in year t) were generated by
the IRS using the “AGI-gap approach.” Simply put, this technique
for estimating the degree of aggregate federal personal income tax
evasion compares the total adjusted gross income (AGI) estimated
from the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) with the total
adjusted gross income reported on tax returns submitted to the IRS
(IRS 2010: Table 6). The difference between these two estimates is
referred to as the “AGI gap”; the latter effectively represents the
aggregate degree to which taxpayers as a whole underreport their
adjusted gross income (Ledbetter 2007: 35). Thus, the IRS personal
income tax evasion estimates do not depend upon any of the variables
expressed in the model.
The (P-P) Phillips-Perron and ADF (Augmented Dickey-Fuller) unit
root tests indicate that the variable MAXT is stationary in only first
differences, whereas the variable PENALTY is stationary only in second
differences over the study period. Furthermore, the variables UN,
TF/TEN, and APPROV are stationary in levels, and the variables
(UAGI/RAGI) and AUDIT are stationary in levels with a trend variable.
Accordingly, in the estimations, the variable PENALTY is expressed
in second differences, and the variable MAXT is expressed in first
differences. In addition, a linear trend variable (TREND) is included
in the analysis.
The OLS (ordinary least squares) estimation of Equation (13), adopt-
ing the Newey-West heteroskedasticity correction, is given by:
UAGI RAGI MAXT TF TEN TRAt t t( ) = + − ( ) −
+
−
−t 8328 44 0 0 8 97 0 81
3
1 1. . . .
.
Δ
11 2 52 1 86
0 25 0 0 11 1
( ) −( ) −( )
+ + − −
− −
. .
. . . .1 252 3 6UN TREND APPROVt t 88
6 66 4 28 8 92 3 83
0 215
1
1
AUDIT
PENALTY
t
t
−
−
+( ) +( ) −( ) −( )
−
−
. . . .
. ΔΔ
2 75
0 0 0 0 02 2
.
. , . , . , . , .
( )
= = = = =R adjR F DW Rho9 87 22 52 1 89 5
(14)
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where terms in parentheses are t-values, D is the first-differences
operator, and DD is the second-differences operator.
In Equation (14), the estimated coefficients on all seven of the
explanatory variables exhibit the hypothesized signs, with five being
statistically significant at the 1 percent level, one being statistically
significant at the 2.5 percent level, and one being statistically signifi-
cant at the 10 percent level. The coefficient of determination is 0.90
and the adjusted coefficient of determination is 0.87, so that the model
explains roughly nine-tenths of the variation in the dependent (tax
evasion) variable. The F-statistic is significant at the 1 percent level,
attesting to the overall strength of the estimate. Finally, there should
be no concern regarding autocorrelation. For the interested reader, a
plot of the variables in Equation (14), including the personal income
tax evasion variable, is provided in Figure 1.
Figure 1
Plot of Variables in Basic Model
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The estimated coefficient on the DMAXT variable is positive and
statistically significant at beyond the 1 percent level. Thus, the
higher the maximum marginal federal personal income tax rate, the
greater the degree of federal income tax evasion by households,
presumably because a higher income tax rate increases the incentive
to evade taxes. This finding is consistent in principle with the con-
ventional wisdom and with several previous empirical studies (Tanzi
1982; Clotfelter 1983; Feige 1994; Alm and Yunus 2009; Cebula and
Coombs 2009). The estimated coefficient on the TF/TEN variable is
negative and statistically significant at the 2.5 percent level, affirming
the hypothesis in Cebula (2004) that this form of legal tax avoid-
ance acts to reduce the degree of illegal tax evasion. The estimated
coefficient on the Tax Reform Act of 1986 dummy variable (TRA)
is negative, as hypothesized (Musgrave 1987), and statistically sig-
nificant at the 8 percent level, providing evidence, albeit modest,
that taxpayers may have regarded the Tax Reform Act of 1986 as a
genuine, honest effort to reform the inequities of and diminish the
complexities (compliance costs) of the existing Internal Revenue
Code. Alternatively, as implied by Slemrod (1992: 45), the observed
drop in personal federal income tax evasion for this brief period
may simply have reflected the time frame required by taxpayers
to learn about and adjust to this allegedly “sweepingly reformed”
(Musgrave 1987) new version of the Internal Revenue Code. The
estimated coefficient on the unemployment rate variable (UN) is
positive, as hypothesized, and statistically significant at the 1 percent
level. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that the higher
the unemployment rate, the greater the degree to which house-
holds enter the underground economy (Alm and Yunus 2009;
Gahramanov 2009; Cebula and Coombs 2009). The variable TREND
is positive and statistically significant, as one would expect in view
of the results of the P-P and ADF tests. Next, there is the issue
involving the presidential job approval rating: “Does a lower
(higher) job approval rating of the president by the U.S. public act
to increase (decrease) the degree of aggregate federal personal
income tax evasion?” As shown in Equation (14), the estimated co-
efficient on variable APPROV is negative (as hypothesized) and
statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Thus, this finding in
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Equation (14) provides empirical support for this hypothesis (Cebula
2008).
The estimated coefficients on the variables AUDIT and PENALTY
are both negative (as hypothesized); furthermore, the coefficients on
the AUDIT and PENALTY variables are both statistically significant at
the 1 percent level. These results are consistent with other studies
for the United States, including the recent analyses by Cebula and
Coombs (2009) and Alm and Yunus (2009). In any case, these two
findings combined would suggest that taxpayers are discouraged
from tax evasion behavior by increased prospects of detection (as
represented by variable AUDIT) on the one hand and that they are
dissuaded from engaging in income tax evasion by higher interest rate
penalties imposed by the IRS when such personal income tax evasion
behavior is in fact detected (as reflected in the variable PENALTY).
For the interested reader, a plot of the actual IRS estimates of
unreported AGI as a percent of reported AGI, the estimates of unre-
ported AGI as a percent of reported AGI obtained from the model in
this study, and the residuals is provided in Figure 2. As shown in
Figure 2, the residuals are modest in size, reflecting the finding that the
actual IRS estimate of unreported income is very close to the estimate
based on the model.
In addition, a plot of IRS estimated revenue losses from personal
income tax evasion versus the estimates of IRS estimated revenue
losses from personal income tax evasion as obtained from the model
in this study are provided in Figure 3 (in billions of current dollars).
Clearly, the predicted lost tax revenues from personal income tax
evasion obtained from the model are very close in magnitude to
those derived by the IRS (2010: Table 6, 2005: Table 7). Moreover, as
shown in Figure 3, we observe that the trend in these revenues lost
to the IRS is upwards, that is, is increasing over time. Furthermore,
as shown in Figure 4, even after adjusting for inflation, there is an
upward trend over time to these lost revenues even when converted
to constant (year 2000) dollars. Also evident from Figure 4, the pre-
dicted lost real tax revenues from personal income tax evasion
obtained from the model are very close in magnitude to those
derived by the IRS. In any event, before proceeding to the speci-
fic empirical results, it is perhaps noteworthy to stress here that
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corporate evasion of federal income taxation and IRS revenue losses
resulting from same are excluded from the present study; the focus
here in other words is solely on personal income tax evasion.
Although corporate evasion of federal income taxation is excluded
from this study, it is noted that researchers have found this category
of income tax evasion to be widespread and substantial (Kamdar
1997; Joulfaian 2000; Burman 2003).
In order to test the robustness and consistency of the model in
Equation (13), the model is now estimated in both semi-log form and
then in log-log form. The results of the semi-log estimates are shown in
columns (a) and (b) of Table 1. In column (a) of Table 1, the estimate
of Equation (13) in semi-log form is presented, whereas in column (b)
the estimate of Equation (13) in semi-log form, with the statistically
insignificant TRA variable omitted, is provided. In column (a) of Table 2,
the estimate of Equation (13) in log-log form is provided, while in
Figure 2
Plot of Actual IRS Estimates of Unreported AGI (TAXEVA), Model
Estimates of Unreported AGI (MODELESTTAXEVASION), and
Residuals (RESID)
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column (b) of Table 2 the log-log estimation is provided with the
once-again statistically insignificant TRA variable omitted.
In Table 1, the coefficients on the MAXT variable in columns (a) and
(b) are both positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent level,
implying that tax evasion is an increasing function of the maximum
marginal personal income tax rate. The coefficients on the (TF/TEN)
variable are negative, as expected, and statistically significant at the
2.5 percent level in one case (column (a)) and at the 1 percent level
in the second case (column (b), where the TRA variable is omitted),
implying that the greater the ratio of the tax-free interest rate yield
to the taxable interest rate yield, the less the aggregate degree
of personal income tax evasion. In column (a), the TRA variable is
actually positive, although not statistically significant. The coefficients
on the UN variable in columns (a) and (b) both are positive, as
expected, and statistically significant at the 1 percent level, implying
that personal income tax evasion is an increasing function of the
Figure 3
IRS Estimates of Lost Tax Revenue (IRSESTLOSTREVENUES) Versus
Model Estimates of Lost Tax Revenue (MODELESTLOSTREVENUES)
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unemployment rate. The coefficients on variable APPROV in columns
(a) and (b) of Table 1 both are negative and statistically significant
at the 1 percent level, implying that tax evasion is a decreasing
function of the presidential approval rating. In addition, in columns (a)
and (b), the coefficients on both the AUDIT and PENALTY variables are
all negative and statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The latter
findings imply that tax evasion is a decreasing function of both the IRS
audit rate and the IRS penalty interest rate assessment on detected
unreported income. The R2 is 0.88 in both estimates, whereas the
adjusted R2 is 0.83 in column (a) and 0.84 in column (b), so that this
log-log model explains approximately five-sixths of the variation in
the dependent variable. Once again, the F-statistic in both estimates is
statistically significant at beyond the 1 percent level.
In the log-log estimates shown in Table 2, the estimated values are
actually elasticities rather than coefficients per se. Aside from the case
of the TRA variable, the elasticities shown in Table 2 all exhibit the
Figure 4
IRS Estimates of Real Lost Tax Revenue (IRSLISTREVESTIMATEREAL)
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expected signs and all (with one exception) are statistically signifi-
cant at the 1 percent level. In this set of estimates, as in Table 1 and
in Equation (14), only the TRA variable fails to yield a statistically
significant (at the generally more acceptable 5 percent level) outcome;
hence, it is omitted from the remainder of the estimates. In any case,
based on the other results in this table, aggregate income tax evasion
Table 1
Semi-Log Estimates: Log (UAGI/RAGI)
Variable\Estimation (a) (b)
Constant 3.767 3.846
DMAXTt-1 0.0063*** 0.0056***
(3.37) (4.85)
(TF/TEN)t-1 -0.761** -0.906***
(-2.65) (-3.03)
TRAt -0.048 —
(-1.57)
UNt-1 0.094*** 0.099***
(6.89) (7.36)
TREND 0.019*** 0.022***
(4.68) (5.45)
APPROVt-1 -0.022*** -0.023***
(-9.50) (-9.43)
AUDITt-1 -0.138*** -0.142***
(-3.61) (-3.52)
DDPENALTYt-1 -0.017*** -0.016***
(-2.87) (-2.94)
R 2 0.88 0.88
AdjR 2 0.83 0.84
F 17.3*** 20.27***
DW 2.06 2.10
Rho -0.03 -0.05
***Indicates statistically significant at the 1 percent level; **indicates statistically
significant at the 2.5 percent level; and *indicates statistically significant at the 5 percent
level.
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is an increasing function of the maximum marginal personal income
tax rate and the civilian unemployment rate, while being a decreasing
function of the ratio of the tax-free interest rate yield to the taxable
interest rate yield and the presidential approval rating. Finally, the
results in Table 2 also imply that income tax evasion is a decreasing
function of both the IRS audit rate and the IRS penalty interest rate
Table 2
Log-Log Estimates: Log (UAGI/RAGI)
Variable\Estimation (a) (b)
Constant 2.82 2.75
Log MAXTt-1 0.115*** 0.127***
(3.09) (2.89)
Log (TF/TEN)t-1 -0.89*** -0.79***
(-2.72) (-3.17)
TRAt 0.043 —
(0.97)
Log UNt-1 0.746*** 0.72***
(6.40) (8.39)
TREND 0.021*** 0.02***
(4.04) (5.16)
Log APPROVt-1 -0.57*** -0.547***
(-4.81) (-4.33)
Log AUDITt-1 -0.206*** -0.20***
(-4.57) (-5.06)
Log PENALTYt-1 -0.233*** -0.218***
(-2.91) (-2.98)
R 2 0.91 0.91
AdjR 2 0.87 0.87
F 51.74*** 51.21***
DW 2.07 1.96
Rho -0.04 0.02
***Indicates statistically significant at the 1 percent level; **indicates statistically
significant at the 2.5 percent level; and *indicates statistically significant at the 5 percent
level.
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assessment on detected unreported income. All of these results are
consistent with the findings in Equation (14) and in Table 1, attesting
to the overall strength and consistency of the basic model. The R2
is 0.91, whereas the adjusted R2 is 0.87, so that this log-log model
explains roughly nine-tenths of the variation in the dependent vari-
able. Once again, the F-statistic is statistically significant at beyond the
1 percent level.
Arguably, to the extent that log-log estimation results (since they
deal in comparisons involving percentage changes) may be more
easily explained both to policymakers and to the general public than
either linear or semi-log estimation results (Murray 2006), an interpre-
tation of the elasticities provided in Table 2 would seem reasonable
and appropriate. Moreover, given that the R2 and adjusted R2 values,
as well as the F-statistics, are higher in the log-log estimations than in
the linear and semi-log estimations, it seems all the more reasonable
to use the results in Table 2 to elaborate on the size of the impacts of
each of the explanatory variables on income tax evasion.
Focusing for simplicity of exposition on column (b) of Table 2,
a 1 percent increase in the maximum marginal federal personal
income tax rate would be expected to elevate aggregate personal
income tax evasion by roughly 0.127 percent. A 1 percent increase
in the ratio of the tax-free interest rate yield to the taxable 10-year
Treasury note yield would reduce tax evasion by about 0.79 percent.
A 1 percent increase in the unemployment rate would elicit a 0.72
percent increase in tax evasion. A 1 percent rise in the presidential
approval rating would be expected to reduce tax evasion by about
0.55 percent. Next, a 1 percent rise in the formal audit rate of filed
personal income tax returns by IRS examiners would act to reduce
tax evasion by about 0.2 percent; this finding confirms claims to
this effect by Burman (2003). Finally, a 1 percent increase in the IRS
penalty interest rate assessment on detected unreported income
would be expected to reduce aggregate personal income tax evasion
by roughly 0.22 percent. Thus, there appears to be strong evidence
that, over the study period, increased IRS audit rates and penalty
interest rate assessments could have effectively increased federal
personal income tax compliance (reduced personal income tax
evasion).
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Additional Estimates and Variables
In this subsection of the study, in order to further test the robustness
of the model and analysis and to extend the model, two additional
variables to the basic model are considered. The first of these variables
has been entirely overlooked in the existing published literature on
income tax evasion in the United States. The second variable has
received very little attention in the literature.
The first extension is to introduce into the model a measure of
the real rate of interest, to be used as a measure of the opportunity
cost of tax compliance. In the interest of thoroughness, two alternative
real interest rates are considered. The first of these is the ex post real
interest rate yield on Moody’s Baa-rated long-term corporate bonds,
RBaa, where RBaa is the nominal average interest rate yield on
Moody’s long-term corporate bonds in a given year minus the actual
inflation rate during that year (Council of Economic Advisors 2010:
Tables B-73, B-64). This is a variable altogether overlooked in previ-
ous related empirical studies. It is argued here that the higher the
RBaa, the greater the expected benefits (eb) from engaging in income
tax evasion since the dollars gained from that tax evasion can be
invested in higher yielding securities (even after having adjusted for
inflation). Alternatively stated, the higher the level of RBaa, the greater
the opportunity costs of tax compliance. Accordingly, it is hypoth-
esized that the higher the RBaa, the higher the eb associated with
income tax evasion and hence the higher the aggregate degree of
federal personal income taxation, ceteris paribus.
As an alternative to RBaa, this study examines the adoption of
the ex post real average annual interest rate yield on three-year
U.S. Treasury notes, RTHREE. Paralleling the computation of RBaa,
RTHREE equals the nominal interest rate yield on three-year Treasury
notes in a given year minus the actual inflation rate in that year
(Council of Economic Advisors 2010: Tables B-73, B-64). Considera-
tion of this alternative measure of the opportunity cost of tax compli-
ance is a reflection of the fact that the ratings assigned by ratings
agencies have become suspect in recent years. For example, Liebowitz
(2009), Barth (2009), and others have questioned the dependability of
bond ratings and related activities by Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s,
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and Fitch, arguing in part that these rating agencies incorrectly rated
(overrated) many financial instruments and companies, particularly
in the period leading up to and during the financial crisis of recent
years. In any case, the higher the level of RTHREE, the greater the
opportunity costs of tax compliance and thus the greater the degree of
personal income tax evasion, ceteris paribus.
In seeking to explain aggregate federal personal income tax evasion
for the heretofore unstudied period for the United States running
through 2005, the second extension of the model introduces the
variable DIS. The variable DIS is the so-called public dissatisfaction
with government index (University of Michigan Institute for Social
Research 2007). This variable measures (a) the degree to which the
public distrusts public officials (other than the president) to fulfill their
job obligations; (b) the degree to which the public regards govern-
ment officials as dishonest; and (c) the degree to which the public
believes that government officials waste tax dollars. The value of the
index ranges from -1.5 to +1.5, with a higher index value signifying
a greater degree of dissatisfaction with government. Interestingly, as
observed in Cebula (2008), the variables DIS and APPROV are almost
entirely unrelated statistically; indeed, they have a correlation coeffi-
cient of only +0.139. In any event, the impact of this variable on tax
evasion has been studied only twice before (Feige 1994; Cebula 2001).
Following Feige (1994) and Cebula (2001), it can be argued that the
greater the public’s dissatisfaction with government, the greater the
secondary gain from not reporting or from underreporting taxable
income, ceteris paribus. Accordingly, since a higher level of DIS
implies a higher level of eb (through these secondary gains), it is
hypothesized that the aggregate degree of federal personal income
taxation is positively impacted by DIS, ceteris paribus.
The equations to be estimated are now given by the following:
UAGI RAGI a a MAXT a TF TEN a TRA
a UN a APP
t t t t
t
( ) = + + ( ) +
+ +
−
−
−
0 1 1 2 1 3
4 1 5 ROV a AUDIT
a PENALTY a RBaa a DIS u
t t
t t t
− −
− −
+
+ + + +
1 6 1
7 1 8 1 9
(15)
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a UN a APP
t t t t
t
( ) = + + ( ) +
+ +
−
−
−
0 1 1 2 1 3
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a PENALTY a RTHREE a DIS u
t t
t t t
− −
− −
+
+ + + +
1 6 1
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where:
RBaat-1 = the ex post real average interest rate yield on Moody’s long-
term corporate bonds in year t-1, expressed as a percentage;
RTHREEt-1 = the ex post real average interest rate yield on three-year
U.S. Treasury notes in the year t - 1, expressed as a percentage; and
DISt = the public dissatisfaction with government index in year t.
Observe that the variable DIS is un-lagged. This reflects the finding in
Cebula (2001), albeit for the earlier period 1973–1997, that the deci-
sion as to whether or not to evade taxes was contemporaneous with
the public’s dissatisfaction with government. Furthermore, as in the
earlier period studied by Cebula (2001), the P-P and ADF tests both
reveal that the variable DIS is stationary only in first differences;
therefore, DIS must be expressed only in first-differences form in
any estimation, that is, in the form DDISt. Similarly, the P-P and ADF
tests reveal that both real interest rates are stationary only in first
differences; hence, both RBaa and RTHREE are expressed in first-
differences forms in these TSLS estimates, as DRBaa and DRTHREE,
respectively.
Given that the variables (UAGI/RAGI)t and DISt are contemporane-
ous, the possibility of simultaneity bias exists. This was verified using
the Hausman (1982) specification test. Accordingly, the models in
Equations (15) and (16) are estimated by TSLS (two-stage least
squares), with the instrumental variable being the two-year lag of the
average effective federal personal income tax rate, ATRt-2. The choice
of this instrument is based on two findings: (1) that variables ATRt-2
and DDISt are highly correlated and (2) that the instrument is not
correlated with the error terms in the system.
The TSLS estimates of Equations (15) and (16) are provided in
columns (a) and (b), respectively, of Table 3. In the estimate in
column (a), all eight of the coefficients on the explanatory variables
exhibit the expected signs. Of these eight “correctly signed” estimated
coefficients, five are statistically significant at the 1 percent level,
two are statistically significant at the 2.5 percent level [(TF/TEN) and
DDIS)], and one is statistically significant at the 5 percent level
[DRBaa]. The F-statistic in this TSLS estimate is statistically significant
at the 1 percent level, attesting once again to the overall strength of
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the model. Overall, except for the RTHREE and DIS variables (which
are not included in the earlier estimates in this study), the results in
column (a) are entirely compatible with their counterparts in Equation
(14) and in Tables 1 and 2. Thus, as in these other estimates, the TSLS
Table 3
Two-Stage Least Squares Estimates: (UAGI/RAGI)
Variable\Estimation (a) (b)
Constant 33.69 33.96
DMAXTt-1 0.071** 0.071***
(2.57) (2.89)
(TF/TEN)t-1 -15.96*** -15.6***
(-4.77) (-5.34)
UNt-1 1.34*** 1.35***
(9.12) (10.55)
TREND 0.35*** 0.344***
(7.43) (9.60)
APPROVt-1 -0.327*** -0.334***
(-10.92) (-12.58)
AUDITt-1 -1.95** -2.08***
(-2.47) (-2.93)
DDPENALTYt-1 -0.269*** -0.327***
(-4.82) (-5.17)
DRBaat-1 0.225* —
(2.25)
DRTHREEt-1 — 0.24***
(2.92)
DDISt 1.96** 1.76***
(2.58) (2.78)
F 20.35*** 25.57***
DW 2.04 2.02
Rho -0.02 -0.01
***Indicates statistically significant at the 1 percent level; **indicates statistically
significant at the 2.5 percent level; and *indicates statistically significant at the 5 percent
level.
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results in column (a) of Table 3 imply that personal income tax
evasion is an increasing function of DMAXT and UN and a decreasing
function of (TF/TEN), APPROV, AUDIT, and DDPENALTY. In addition
to these findings, the results in column (a) of Table 3 imply that
income tax evasion is an increasing function of both the ex post real
interest rate, DRBaa, and the public’s dissatisfaction with government
per se, namely, DDIS. Thus, a higher real interest rate yield on Moody’s
Baa-rated corporate bonds can be expected to reduce tax compliance
(increase tax evasion), whereas an increase in the public’s dissatisfac-
tion with government (other than the president) can also be expected
to reduce tax compliance (increase tax evasion).
In the estimate in column (b) of Table 3, all eight of the coeffi-
cients on the explanatory variables exhibit the expected signs and
are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The F-statistic in
this TSLS estimate is statistically significant at the 1 percent level,
attesting yet again to the overall strength of the model. Once again,
except for the RTHREE and DIS variables (which are not included
in the earlier estimates in this study), the results in column (a) are
entirely compatible with their counterparts in Equation (14) and
Tables 1 and 2. Thus, as in these other estimates, the TSLS results in
column (b) imply that income tax evasion is an increasing function
of DMAXT and UN and a decreasing function of (TF/TEN), APPROV,
AUDIT, and DDPENALTY. In addition to these findings, the results in
column (b) imply that personal income tax evasion is an increasing
function of both the ex post real interest rate, DRTHREE, and the
variable reflecting the public’s dissatisfaction with government
per se, namely, DDIS. Thus, a higher real interest rate yield on
three-year Treasury notes can be expected to increase tax evasion,
whereas an increase in the public’s dissatisfaction with government
(other than the president) can also be expected to increase tax
evasion.
Based on the findings summarized in Table 3, it appears that the
aggregate degree of federal personal income tax evasion, (UAGI/
RAGI), is directly impacted by the variables DMAXT, UN, DRBaa,
DRTHREE, and DDIS, while being negatively impacted by the variables
(TF/TEN), APPROV, AUDIT, and DDPENALTY. The variables RTHREE
and RBaa have not previously been investigated in aggregate
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time-series studies of personal income tax evasion in the United States,
whereas the variable APPROV has been previously studied only once
(Cebula 2008) and the variable DDIS has previously been studied only
twice (Feige 1994; Cebula 2001). In any event, the empirical results in
Table 3 further affirm the robustness and consistency of the basic
model examined in this study.
Conclusion and Policy Implications
This study has used OLS and TSLS estimations to identify key deter-
minants of aggregate federal personal income tax evasion in the
United States for the period 1976–2005. Only one related study has
appeared that investigates beyond the year 1997, and that more
narrowly focused study (Cebula and Coombs 2009) runs only through
the year 2001 and uses a non-IRS dataset (Ledbetter 2004).
The empirical estimates provided in the present study indicate
that the aggregate degree of federal personal income tax evasion,
(UAGI/RAGI)t, is directly impacted by the maximum marginal federal
personal income tax rate (DMAXT), the unemployment rate (UN), the
real interest rate yield (represented as either the real annual average
interest rate yield on Moody’s Baa-rated long-term corporate bonds,
DRBaa, or the real annual average interest rate yield on three-year
Treasury notes, DRTHREE), and the public’s dissatisfaction with gov-
ernment, other than the president, (DDIS). Aggregate personal federal
income tax evasion also is negatively impacted by the variables
(TF/TEN), the ratio of the tax-free interest rate yield on high-grade
municipals to the taxable interest rate yield on 10-year Treasury notes,
APPROV, the public’s job approval rating of the president per se (that
is, as opposed to government in general), the IRS audit rate on filed
federal personal income tax returns, AUDIT, and DDPENALTY, the
interest rate penalty imposed by the IRS on detected unreported
income.
Interestingly, none of these factors has been investigated to date for
the years 2002–2005, the most recent years for which the IRS has
developed its newest estimates of household (personal) income tax
evasion. Furthermore, this is the only study to date to investigate the
impact of the real interest rate on personal income tax evasion.
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Moreover, only one previous study has investigated the tax evasion
impact of the presidential approval rating (Cebula 2008), whereas only
two previous studies have considered the tax evasion impact of the
index of the public’s dissatisfaction with government other than the
president (Feige 1994; Cebula 2001).
So why does personal income tax evasion matter? According to
Burman (2003), personal income tax evasion undermines the tax
system in several ways. On the one hand, it is patently unfair because
“unless caught, cheaters pay less taxes . . .” than law-abiding citizens
(Burman 2003: 2). Arguably, it ultimately also means higher taxes will
be imposed on law-abiding citizens and/or lower levels of govern-
ment services will be provided and/or larger federal budget deficits
and a larger national debt will result (Burman 2003: 2, 6). Indeed, to
the extent that budget deficits are elevated, there is evidence that
long-term interest rates may be forced upwards and private invest-
ment may be crowded out (Burman 2003: 3; Carlson and Spencer
1975; Cebula 1978).
Given that income tax evasion does matter, what are some of the
policy implications of our results? To answer this question, it is useful
to review some of the empirical results from this empirical study.
As observed, the results obtained in the study that can perhaps be
most easily interpreted for and explained to policymakers and the
public are those yielded by the log-log estimates found in Table 2. As
summarized above, those basic findings include the following: (a) a
1 percent increase in the maximum marginal federal personal income
tax rate would be expected to elevate aggregate personal income
tax evasion by roughly 0.127 percent; (b) a 1 percent increase in
the unemployment rate would elicit a 0.72 percent increase in tax
evasion; (c) a 1 percent increase in the formal audit rate of filed
personal income tax returns by IRS examiners would act to reduce
tax evasion by about 0.2 percent; and (d) a 1 percent increase in the
IRS penalty interest rate assessment on detected unreported income
would be expected to reduce aggregate personal income tax evasion
by roughly 0.22 percent.
Clearly, to the extent that economic policy can promote real eco-
nomic growth and a reduction in the unemployment rate, obviously
there is evidence that this will do much to raise tax compliance and
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hence IRS revenues. However, it appears that policymakers should be
circumspect about elevating the maximum marginal tax rate since
such a policy does elevate tax evasion, and according to Burman
(2003: 2), this is especially true of the highest income segment of our
society. Furthermore, such tax increases may also act to reduce “fiscal
freedom” and thereby to reduce economic growth (Heckelman and
Stroup 2000; Nelson and Singh 1998).
Moreover, based on the empirical findings provided in this study,
there appears to be strong evidence that increased IRS audit rates and
penalty interest rate assessments could effectively increase federal
personal income tax compliance. This finding is consistent in varying
degrees with both recent and less recent studies of earlier time
periods in the United States (Alm and Yunus 2009; Burman 2003;
Cebula 2008; Cebula and Coombs 2009; Clotfelter 1983; Connelly
2004; Feige 1994; Feinstein 1991; Long and Gwartney 1987; Thurman
1991). Thus, it would seem that increasing the IRS audit rate and the
IRS penalty interest rate assessment would be viable policies for
reducing the “tax gap.” Indeed, it is claimed by Burman (2003: 2) that
if the IRS could successfully close half the tax gap through such
policies, “we could [among other things] . . . cut [personal] income tax
rates by 10 percent.”
The potential benefits of these policies notwithstanding, it must also
remain clear to policymakers that there is “a risk that compliance
activity could go too far” (Burman 2003: 3). Indeed, although it lies
beyond the scope of this study, there clearly could well exist, for any
given set of circumstances, an “optimum” IRS audit rate and an
“optimum” penalty interest rate assessment. Future related research
might well endeavor to develop a paradigm that identifies the nature
and dimensions of such an optimum.
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